
GSPC Dossier

CENTER FOR POLICING TERRORISM

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FOR THE CENTER FOR POLICING TERRORISM

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Executive Summary

The Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat, known by its French acronym— GSPC— is the most sophisticated and deadly jihadist group in Algeria. It maintains ties to the Al Qaeda network and has declared war on Algeria’s secular authorities and the West. Its principal aims are to establish an Islamic state in Algeria and attack Western targets, such as companies and people throughout North Africa. GSPC ideology, a philosophy shared by Osama Bin Laden, calls for a Pan-Islamic movement to return to the pure roots of the religion, as the prophet Mohammad and his companions practiced.

GSPC was founded in the late 1990s— with the help of Osama Bin Laden— as an outgrowth of the Armed Islamic Group (GIA). By 1998, GSPC had surpassed GIA as the most effective terrorist group in Algeria and by 2000, the group had taken over GIA’s networks of operatives and funding across Europe and North Africa. Using these new European links, GSPC recruited heavily among the large bases of dispersed Algerian teenagers and found particular success in France. GSPC now enjoys a sprawling structure, with operations in Algeria, Niger, Chad, Mauritania, Mali, Libya, and throughout Europe and parts of the Middle East.

Recent counter-terrorism operations against GSPC by the Algerian government have (allegedly) caused severe damage to the organization. The US government also led an operation known as the Trans-Sahara Counter-Terrorism Initiative (TSCTI), which coordinated counter-terrorism efforts in North Africa that included GSPC as a target. Thus, it is unclear if GSPC’s current leaders are repairing an old, damaged structure, building a new one, or simply shifting operations to undestroyed networks.

Criminal activity has been one of the most lucrative funding sources for GSPC. Smuggling vehicles, cigarettes, drugs and arms provides income, while petty crimes (car theft, document forgery, etc.) carried out by new recruits brings in the bulk of the money from Europe.

Since its founding, GSPC has used its network in Europe to facilitate Al Qaeda recruitment and operations. In 2003, when Nabil Sahraoui assumed the top GSPC leadership position, the group reaffirmed its allegiance to bin Laden’s organization and the global jihadist agenda. They have facilitated Al Qaeda operations in the United States as well.

Northern Africa and the Middle East



GSPC at a Glance

GSPC	Extremist Islamic group in North Africa and Europe
High Profile Attacks	Abducting European tourists in Algeria (2002); Connection to Millennium Bombing plot (2000)
Possibility of Attack in the U.S.	Medium.
Leaders	Abdelmalek Droukdel and General Abderrezak "El Para"
Likely Targets	Western tourists, monuments, and Western and Algerian government officials and installations
Tactics	Conventional bombs, kidnapping, guerilla-style attacks, and logistical management of terrorist network infrastructure
WMD Capability	Have the capability and intention of trafficking and using chemical weapons

Possibility of Attack in the U.S. in the Next Five Years: Low to Moderate

GSPC (according to open sources) does not have an established network in the United States; nevertheless, the group has tried to attack US targets overseas and has been linked to Algerian terrorists that have tried to attack targets within the US.

On April 4, 2000, Italian police arrested members of a terrorist cell that was plotting to bomb the US Embassy in Rome and had links to bin Laden and GSPC.¹ The Millennium plot to bomb Los Angeles International Airport involved at least three Algerian terrorists: Abdel Ghani Meskini, Ahmed Ressam, and Mokhtar Haouari (Ressam and Haouari were arrested during a routine inspection at the US-Canadian border). In September 2001, GSPC declared that it would “strike hard” at the United States and other countries if they “persist in hunting down Islamist networks in America, Great Britain, France, and Belgium.”

Perhaps the most troubling feature of GSPC is its operational fixation with chemical attacks. GSPC played a large role in Al Qaeda’s ricin network, and one European GSPC cell was caught with chemicals and chemical protection suits.

Though GSPC may not pose a severe short-term threat, they should be considered a longer-term threat to the US. They have proven themselves to be skilled operatives in the European context; able to assimilate and recruit with great skill. According to the 2000 United States Consensus, there are 9,000 Algerians living in the US. Law enforcement communities can stem the long-term threat by establishing relationships within Algerian communities and monitoring the any new arrivals (especially those from Canada, which has over 25,000 Algerians).

One of the Algerians involved in the Millennium plot to bomb LAX, Abdel Ghani Meskini, was living in New York during its planning stages (he has since pleaded guilty to conspiracy and is cooperating with authorities). His story demonstrates how dangerous, GSPC-linked individuals are in place and quite capable to attack targets in New York City. Given GSPC’s tight operational and strategic links to Al Qaeda, any of its operatives inside the US should be considered as dangerous as Al Qaeda operatives.

Chapter 1: Background

Section 1.1: GSPC Overview

GSPC's current size is unknown but estimates range from three hundred to seven hundred members spread throughout Algeria and Europe.² As mentioned, their ideology calls for a Pan-Islamic movement to return to the pure roots of Islam. In practical terms, this means rejection of unwarranted innovations (called *bid'ah*) of doctrine and practice that Muslims in later years brought to the religion. The terms *Salafism* and *Wahabism* are sometimes used interchangeably, but many Salafists see themselves as having taken "purification" one step further. Many have a rigid code in terms of dress and personal appearance— with men required to grow beards and head-to-toe coverage for women in the presence of anyone outside their immediate family. Some Salafists believe in a strict Quranic ban on the use of inventions and developments such as photography, most forms of music, conventional banking, elections, television, radio, and the Internet—though some Salafists believe that the use of some of these innovations is acceptable.³ It is not clear how strictly members of GSPC adhere to Salafist doctrine in their operational, strategic, and personal methods.

On September 23, 2001, President George W. Bush's Executive Order 13224 blocked the finances of the GSPC and other terrorist groups, and on March 27, 2002, the group was designated a Foreign Terrorist Organization by the U.S. government.⁴

Section 1.2: Origins of GSPC and its Leaders


GSPC was founded in the late 1990s— with the help of Osama Bin Laden— as an outgrowth of the Armed Islamic Group (GIA), which was the largest terrorist group in Algeria at the time.⁵ The GIA, led by Djamel Zitouni (alias Abou Aberrahmane Amine), had established itself in Algeria in 1993 by uniting anti-regime guerillas, veterans from the Afghan mujahideen, and other armed groups under one anti-establishment cause. GIA did not limit its targets to military and government officials; they considered journalists and civilians as legitimate targets as well.

GIA's public support in Algeria began to wane in the mid-1990's after it was connected to a series of massacres that drew domestic and international ire. It is alleged that Bin Laden helped to establish GSPC as an alternative to GIA.⁶

Amari Saifi, aka General Abderrezak "El Para," and Hassan Hattab were among the dissenters within the group, issuing a fatwa in December 1997 condemning the lethal drift of GIA strategy. The fatwa called for the creation of a new Islamist military organization in Algeria, of which Hassan Hattab would become the head. El Para, once a member of the Algerian Army's Special Forces Unit, became his second in command and was responsible for operations in the eastern portion of Algeria— known to GSPC members as the fifth military region.⁷



EL PARA



HASSAN HATTAB

Also as mentioned, by 1998 GSPC had surpassed GIA as the most effective terrorist group in Algeria and by 2000, the group had taken over their networks of operatives and funding across Europe and North Africa. Haydar Abu Doha, aka “The Doctor”, played a large role in GSPC’s transformation from a local armed group to an international terrorist organization. Abu Doha has been connected to Ahmed Ressay, the Algerian convicted for attempting to attack the Los Angeles airport during the millennium celebration.⁸ Doha moved to the UK in 1999 after serving as a senior official in an Afghani Al Qaeda training camp. While there, he helped to recruit GSPC members from large bases of disenfranchised Algerian youth in European cities. Many of these disenfranchised youth were engaged in profitable petty crimes such as car theft, credit card fraud, and document forgery, and their earnings were thus used to enrich GSPC’s coffers.⁹

Helping Doha to coordinate cells across Europe were Tarek Maaroufi, a Tunisian living in Italy, and Mohamed Bensakhria, an Algerian living in Germany. Maaroufi and Bensakhria helped Doha to create a large support network in Europe that provided recruits with petty cash, lodgings, and false documents. The depth of its network in Europe was apparent when Italian police broke up a cell in Milan in April 2000 and French police broke up a cell in France.¹⁰

In February 2000, El Para orchestrated one of GSPC’s most effective, large-scale attacks when he killed over 40 Algerian paratroopers with a heavily armed group of GSPC

commandos.¹¹ And between late 2000 and 2001, authorities foiled two GSPC-planned attacks to hit Frankfurt and the US Embassy in Rome.

In 2003, Hassan Hattab was ousted as the leader of GSPC by Nabil Sahraoui (alias Abou Ibrahim Mustapha). Within the Salafist ranks, Hattab was seen as too moderate and unwilling to embrace Al Qaeda's global agenda. Sahraoui, then in his mid 30's, had a reputation for being ruthless and was more eager to align the group with Bin Laden's jihadist goals. After seizing the leadership of GSPC, Sahraoui immediately declared his group's allegiance to Al Qaeda.¹²

Under Sahraoui, GSPC increased its guerilla activity. On January 4, 2003, GSPC killed 51 Algerian security personnel and inflicted upon the Algerian Army its heaviest loss ever for a single guerilla attack. In February 2003, they kidnapped 31 European tourists in the Algerian desert— forcing the German government to pay the group five million Euros for their release.¹³ With such ransom money, El Para began recruiting more fighters, buying weapons and contacting Islamists in Mauritania, Nigeria, Niger, and northern Mali.¹⁴

And in June of 2004, the GSPC "Al-Borkane" cell attacked Algeria's most important electrical production facility, the Hamma Power Station near Algiers, with a truck bomb.¹⁵

Section 1.3: The Next Generation of GSPC Leadership

The Algerian Army eventually killed Nabil Sahraoui (along with three senior aides) in June 2004 in the Bejaia hills of eastern Algeria. Replacing Sabraoui was GSPC's explosives expert Abdelmalek Droukdel, alias Abou Mossab Abdelouadoud, who has been a prominent figure in the group since its inception.¹⁶ Senior leaders of GSPC also include Yahya Abou al-Haytham (commander of the second sector and alleged to be Al Qaeda's ambassador to GSPC), Abu-Ammar (leader of the group in western Algeria) and Ahmed Abou al-Bara (the group's judicial and shari'ah officer).¹⁷

Also playing a key leadership role in GSPC is Mokhtar Belmokhtar, a former fighter in Afghanistan and a critical operative in the 2002 abduction of European tourists in Alergia.¹⁸



BELMOKHTAR

El Para is still among the senior leaders of GSPC, though he has been marginalized by Abdelouadoud and is currently being held in detention by the Chadian rebel group Movement for Democracy and Justice in Chad (MDJT). El Para was captured as he tried to negotiate an alliance between MDJT and GSPC in order to fight African regimes that facilitate the US presence in Africa. While MDJT agreed to turn El Para over to Algerian authorities, they have yet to release the GSPC leader into their custody. It has been reported that the delays are due to the Chadian government's reluctance to approve talks between the Chadian rebel group and the Algerian government.¹⁹

Also among the senior leadership is Abu-Yasir Sayyaf, a prominent member of GSPC's information council²⁰ (Maaroufi and Bensakhria were senior leaders in GSPC's recruiting and cell coordination operations in Europe until their arrests in 2001).

Section 1.4 GSPC's Organization

GSPC has a sprawling structure, operating in Algeria, Niger, Chad, Mauritania, Mali, Libya and throughout Europe and parts of the Middle East. In 2000, they took over GIA networks across Europe in an attempt to establish an "Islamic International" group with guidance from Osama Bin Laden.²¹ The impressive extent of the network was revealed after a spate of arrests and discoveries beginning in 2000. Italian authorities arrested several suspects linked to a GSPC cell in Milan in April 2000. A GSPC cell in France was arrested in connection with a plot to bomb a French market in 2000. In late September 2001, Spanish authorities broke up a GSPC cell containing six Algerians in possession of false passports and document forging equipment. Cell members were also arrested in the Netherlands and Pakistan.²² More recently, an alleged GSPC cell was

uncovered in Lebanon and accused of facilitating the trafficking of militants into Iraq from Sunni strongholds in Tripoli and the Ayn al-Hilwah Palestinian refugee camp.²³

The group's organizational methods are not well understood, but they seem to structure themselves in Algeria according to seven defined and homogenous territorial blocks (with an emir at the top), an overarching "media" unit, "production" unit, and council of notables, which may function as an executive board.²⁴ GSPC operations in Europe seem to be arranged into small cells scattered among major European cities, much like Al Qaeda's structure. Given their strategic and operational similarities, GSPC may also employ Al Qaeda-style specialization by region (e.g. British and Spanish cells responsible for financial operations, French cells responsible for false documents, Italian cells responsible for recruiting and transportation, etc.). GSPC's structure in North Africa appears to be based on maintaining outposts and arms caches in many different countries in order to remain mobile and agile should any one particular country mount a military or law enforcement initiative.

Section 1.5: Training Methods

Numerous GSPC operatives in Algeria and greater Europe have received military training at Al Qaeda camps in Afghanistan.²⁵ Many of the newer recruits in Europe were trained by participating in regional ethnic conflicts, such as those in Bosnia and Chechnya. Libyan authorities discovered GSPC training grounds in the Tibetsi Mountains on Libya's southern border with Chad.²⁶ The group is thought to have numerous training camps throughout the inhospitable terrain of the Sahara.

GSPC members have focused some of their training on underwater demolition. Dutch authorities reported that a GSPC member, Mohamed Bouhmidi, was apprehended while training to become a diver. It is thought that Al Qaida and GSPC members, forming an "Al Qaida Marines," may be deployed in diver cells to attach mines to hulls, bridge supports or oilrigs.²⁷ Much like the Al Qaeda cell that orchestrated the USS Cole Bombing, GSPC members may also be preparing for suicide attacks against shipping or military vessels using small, high-speed boats packed with explosives.

Furthermore, Dutch authorities also reported that GSPC encouraged young Dutch Muslim followers to join the Dutch Army in order to get military training.²⁸

Section 1.6: Financing Methods

Throughout its history, GSPC has tapped into numerous sources to fund operations. They began with a tranche of funding from Bin Laden and may have even received periodic grants from Al Qaeda.²⁹ The group has partly funded its operations with donations from Algerians living abroad, and the Algerian government alleges that Iran and Sudan also provide the group with funding.³⁰

Criminal activity has been one of the most lucrative funding sources for GSPC, as mentioned before. British officials banned the group from their country in March 2001, arguing that GSCP engaged in terrorist activities, racketeering and money laundering.³¹

In 2002 a French journalist infiltrated a GSPC cell in France (run by operative Karim Bourti) to find that it ran a profitable fake, brand-named clothes trafficking operation. According to the journalist, Mohamed Sifaoui, the cell also put pressure on Parisian Muslim leaders to permit them to collect funds in local mosques.³²

Smuggling operations in Algeria have also been profitable for GSPC. Cross-border smuggling in the western portion of the country (in items as exotic as contraband meteorites) is made relatively easy by lack of surveillance and border protection measures between many North African countries.³³ GSPC member Benmokhtar, alleged to have close ties with Al Qaeda, is known as an expert smuggler and has helped GSPC move arms throughout North Africa.³⁴

The ransom payment from one kidnapping episode provided the single greatest payoff in GSPC's history. As mentioned, the German government paid GSPC leader El Para over 5 million Euros for the release of German hostages in 2003. One Western diplomat put that sum of money in perspective, citing that the ransom was equivalent to 25% of Niger's defense budget—a payoff that could vastly restructure the balance of forces between GSPC and North African governments.³⁵

Section 1.7: Recruiting

GSPC's recruiting efforts are designed to create a well-equipped multinational terrorist organization. To this end, GSPC has recruited heavily in Mali, Niger, Mauritania and throughout Europe. British authorities allege that GSPC recruiting in Algeria is done mainly through family ties.³⁶

In Europe, the most lucrative recruiting efforts were those targeted at disenfranchised Algerian youth—French youth in particular. The group's European cells have built on their Algerian base by recruiting radical militants who have returned to Europe after fighting regional conflicts in Bosnia, Chechnya, and Afghanistan.³⁷ The Dutch Internal Security Agency reported that GSPC has recruited young Muslim immigrants at mosques in the Netherlands and has been encouraging young Muslims to join the jihadi movement in conflict zones such as Afghanistan and Kashmir.³⁸ Karim Bourti was alleged to have recruited in mosques, prayer halls, hospitals and prisons, and his efforts supplied him with many college students, an airport maintenance worker, and an ex-convict from Lebanon.³⁹

GSPC also uses recruiting videos to attract potential followers. The videos are often screened in private homes or after prayers in mosques. Many of the showings are timed so that students and schoolchildren can view them. Allegedly, there were several screenings at Finsbury Mosque in north London, where Abu Hamza was leading prayers. In the video, a GSPC leader is shown leading operatives into battle against Algerian

security forces. In gory detail, the video shows GSPC members ambushing and slaughtering twelve Algerian soldiers and then seizing ammunition and weapons from the dead soldiers.⁴⁰

Chapter 2: Modes of Attack

Section 2.1: Guerilla-Style Attacks

Guerilla-style ambushes have been the meat-and-potatoes operation for GSPC since its inception. A June 2004 ambush of Algerian soldiers that left 14 troops dead and an incident at a crowded public beach (two members of GSPC opened fire on two Algerian police officers at point-blank range) illustrate the popularity of the guerilla warfare among the GSCP.⁴¹

Section 2.2: Bombings

GSPC has also used truck bombings as a technique to attack government targets. GSPC's "Vulcano Brigade" took credit for a truck bombing attack against a major Algerian power station wherein GSPC operatives packed a van full of explosives and parked it near to the external wall of the power plant. It was not a suicide operation, however, as GSPC spokesmen claimed its members returned safely to their bases before the explosion.⁴²

GSPC's interest in underwater demolition expertise may also signal an increasing operational orientation towards bombings. GSPC members caught at a Dutch diving school— which had previously trained many Islamic militants— may have been preparing themselves to conduct operations to blow up ship hulls, bridge supports, dams, and oilrigs.⁴³

Section 2.3: Increased Use of High-Tech Equipment

Though GSPC operations have been mainly guerrilla in nature, their spending habits (since the ransom payment windfall) demonstrate an increasing interest in high-tech equipment. With the ransom payment, GSPC is alleged to have purchased surface-to-air missiles, heavy machine guns, mortars, 12.7mm machine guns mounted on Toyota Land Cruisers and satellite positioning equipment.⁴⁴

Section 2.4: Chemical Weapons

GSPC has a well-documented interest in operations that utilize chemical weapons. In December 2002, French police arrested four members of a GSPC Frankfurt cell in possession of chemicals and a military personal-protection suit.⁴⁵ GSPC has also been

heavily involved in Al Qaeda's ricin network in Europe—particularly in London, Manchester, East Anglia, and Edinburgh. GSPC, working with Al Qaeda experts in the Pankishi Gorge in Georgia, were a critical component of the network.⁴⁶ On August 29, 2002, the United States designated eleven members of GSPC as financiers of terror, and the indictment charged nine of the members with conspiracy to traffic in chemical weapons, as well as explosives, arms, and false documents.⁴⁷

Section 2.5: GSPC's Pre-Operational "Signature"

GSPC operations outside of North Africa would almost certainly be bombings or chemical attacks. Raids in the Spanish provinces of Barcelona and Girona in January 2003 uncovered a cache of electronic timing devices, chemical products and remote controls. The police also discovered a manual on electronic circuitry.⁴⁸

Section 2.6: GSPC's Operational "Signature"

GSPC operations within Algeria have a largely guerilla or insurgent quality. Their most likely tactics include ambushes at false roadblocks, raids on military, police, and government convoys and hit-and-run bombings of government facilities. GSPC have also lured security forces into ambushes by setting fire to buildings and youth centers.⁴⁹

Chapter 3: GSPC's Links to Other Terrorist Groups

Section 3.1: Connections to Al Qaeda

GSPC has numerous ties to Al Qaeda. The group was allegedly founded with funding and strategic direction from Osama bin Laden. A former GSPC member, Mohamed Berrached, testified during a tribunal that Osama bin Laden and Hassan Hattab communicated by satellite phone and that Bin Laden had urged Hattab to set up GSPC to give a "better image of the Jihad" against Algerian secular authorities.⁵⁰

Since its founding, GSPC has used its network in Europe to facilitate Al Qaeda recruiting and operations. GSPC leader Doha served as a senior figure at one of Al Qaida's Afghan terrorist camps before moving to Britain in 1999. GSPC also worked closely with Al Qaida experts from Georgia's Pankisi Gorge in establishing a "ricin network" throughout Europe.⁵¹ Yassine Chekkouri, alleged to be one of Al Qaeda's highest ranking members, was linked to GSPC after being arrested in 2001.⁵²

In 2003, when Nabil Sahraoui assumed the top GSPC leadership position, the group reaffirmed its allegiance to Al Qaeda and its global jihadist agenda. GSPC has facilitated Al Qaeda operations in the United States as well. Ahmed Ressam, the Algerian arrested for attempting to bomb Los Angeles International Airport, was connected to a GSPC cell in Spain.⁵³

Section 3.2: Connections to Islamic Separatist Groups

GSPC has cultivated links with many Islamic separatist groups. And it is highly probably that GSPC has made links to the remnants of the GIA, the group from which it originally split. Though the groups may not be coordinating activities, GIA has become—tactically speaking—very similar to GSPC and their main territories within Algeria now overlap (following mutual expansions in their areas of operation in 2002).⁵⁴ It is unclear, however, whether the death of GIA leader Antar Zouabri in February 2002 has accelerated or hampered increased cooperation between the two groups.

GSPC also has links to the Tunisian Combatant Group (TCG). TCG seeks to establish an Islamic government in Tunisia and thus targets the country's interests. They were allegedly founded by GSPC member Tarek Maaroufi in 2000.⁵⁵

GSPC likely has numerous links with regional non-Islamic separatist groups in Mali, Niger, Chad, Mauritania, and Libya. Though GSPC was not successful in convincing the Movement for Justice and Democracy in Chad (MDJT) to establish operational links, senior GSPC leader El Para was certainly determined to float the idea with them before the group abducted him and threatened to turn him over to the Algerian government.⁵⁶ Though explicit links have not been well documented, GSPC clearly has the intention and capability of coordinating with many of the region's Islamic and non-Islamic separatist groups.

GSPC may also have ties with Takfir Wal Hijra, a radical offshoot of the Muslim Brotherhood with direct links to Al Qaeda. In September 2003, a gang of Algerian terrorists were pursued by British authorities after gaining entry into the UK. In the gang were two members of GSPC, Ali Khelifi and Omar Saiki, and senior figures belonging to Takfir Wal Hijra.⁵⁷

Chapter 4: Operations in the United States

Section 4.1: GSPC and the United States

GSPC has no established network in the United States, but the group has tried to attack US targets overseas and has been linked to Algerian terrorists that have tried to attack targets in the US.

On April 4, 2000, Italian police arrested members of an Italian cell with links to bin Ladin and GSPC, who were plotting to bomb the US Embassy in Rome.⁵⁸ The Millennium plot to bomb Los Angeles International Airport involved at least three Algerian terrorists, Abdel Ghani Meskini, Ahmed Ressam, and Mokhtar Haouari. Ressam and Haouari were arrested during a routine inspection at the US-Canadian

border. In addition, after the US government froze GIA's assets, it was reported several GIA operatives were in North America.⁵⁹

In September 2001, GSPC declared that it would "strike hard" at the United States and other countries if they "persist in hunting down Islamist networks in America, Great Britain, France, and Belgium."⁶⁰

Due to GSPC's very close ties to Al Qaeda, the group's priorities most likely fall into line with Al Qaeda's priorities: attacking targets in North America, Europe, Australia, and Israel. GSPC's role in an attack within the US might fall under the category of logistical assistance—e.g. forged document provision, recruiting operatives, smuggling chemicals, etc—using GSPC's extensive network in Europe.

Perhaps the most troubling feature of GSPC is its operational fixation with chemical attacks. GSPC played a large role in Al Qaeda's ricin network and one European GSPC cell was caught with chemicals and chemical protection suits.

Though GSPC may not pose a severe short-term threat, they should be considered a longer-term threat to the US. They have proven themselves to be skilled operatives in the European context, able to assimilate and recruit with great skill. According to the 2000 United States Census, there are 9,000 Algerians living in the US.⁶¹ Law enforcement communities can stem the long-term threat by building relationships with Algerian communities and monitoring the influx of foreign-born Algerians, especially those from Canada, which has over 25,000 Algerians.⁶²

Section 4.2: The U.S. as a GSPC Target: Low to Moderate

One of the Algerians involved with the Millennium plot to bomb the airport in LA, Abdel Ghani Meskini, was living in New York at the time of the plotting. He has since pleaded guilty to conspiracy and is cooperating with authorities.⁶³ This incident demonstrates that GSPC-linked individuals were capable of attacking targets in New York City.

Given GSPC's tight operational and strategic links to Al Qaeda, any GSPC operatives inside the US should be considered as dangerous as Al Qaeda operatives.

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